The paper studies procurement contracts with pre-project investigations under hidden information and hidden action. The principal generally benefits from inducing the agent to conduct pre-project investigations to avoid cost overruns and false project cancelations.
Introduction
Practitioners experienced in managing procurement projects stress the importance of preproject planning. Based on a number of case studies, Gibson and Hamilton (1994) conclude that "there does exist a positive, quantifiable relationship between effort expended during the pre-project planning phase and the ultimate success of a project."
1 The goal of pre-project investigations is to obtain more accurate cost estimates, which allow the procurer to decide more carefully about whether to implement the project. Pre-project planning is, in other words, a process of information acquisition before the final implementation decision is taken. 2 The project management literature not only stresses the importance of effective pre-project planning but also warns procurers to keep as much control over this process as possible. For instance, Gibson et al. (2006, p.41) write in their empirical appraisal that procurers frequently "decide to delegate the pre-project planning process entirely to contractors, often with disastrous results".
Given the importance of pre-project planning and these observed "disastrous results" from delegation, we develop and analyze an economic model of pre-project planning to enhance our understanding of the process and the associated problems.
Our starting point is the observation that the observed "disastrous results" from delegation point to diverging objectives between the procurer and contractor and subsequent incentive problems. Due to the contractor's superior expertise, we can identify three sources of incentive problems in pre-project investigations. First, the contractor is already in a better position to estimate the project's cost from the very outset. Hence, the procurer-contractor relationship typically exhibits ex ante hidden information. Second, the contractor, as the expert, is often in the better position to evaluate the additional information which the pre-project investigation reveals. Hence, pre-project investigations lead to ex post or, more appropriately, interim hidden information. Third, the amount of information that results from pre-investigations will largely depend on the contractor's own actions such as his advice and expertise on how to perform the investigations. Hence, pre-project investigations often also involve a hidden action problem.
1 See also, e.g., Turner (1993) , Gibson et al. (2006) , Kähkönen (1999) and Dahlin, Bjelm, and Svensson (1999) . 2 Gibson et. al. (1995) define pre-project planning "as the process of developing sufficient strategic information for owners to address risk and decide whether to commit resources to maximize the change for a successful capital facility project".
To better understand these incentive problems, we study the optimal design of procurement contracts with pre-project investigations. Intuitively, the procurer's main concern is to protect herself against the risk that the contractor abuses pre-project investigations to enhance his informational advantage. In order to explore how these concerns affect the pre-project planning phase, we first investigate the conditions under which costly pre-investigations should be conducted and for which purpose. With these insights, we then study how the procurer optimally structures her contracts to deal with the diverse incentive problems. Finally, we investigate how the incentive problems distort pre-investigations and affect their economic value.
From a more theoretical perspective, pre-project investigation is a process of information acquisition that influences the information structure over time. As a consequence, the design of optimal pre-project investigations is a problem of optimal dynamic mechanism design. Our approach is, therefore, to extend the standard procurement models based on Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1986) and study the optimal design of procurement contracts when the agent (contractor) can obtain additional private information about the project's cost before the project is executed. Our extension, moreover, incorporates the aforementioned three sources of asymmetric information: an ex ante hidden information problem, an interim hidden information problem, and a hidden action problem.
Our results are as follows. First, we derive the first-best solution for the benchmark case in which there are no incentive problems. We show that in the first-best pre-investigations are used to mitigate one of two implementation errors. If the initial information about the project is favorable and indicates a positive social value, then the pre-investigation is used to prevent cost overruns. In this case, the economic value of the pre-investigation is the expected social value from canceling a high cost project that initially looked promising. For this case, we say that information acquisition prevents false positives (or type I errors). In contrast, if the initial cost information is unfavorable so that it leads to a cancelation of the project, then the pre-investigation is used to correct a possibly false cancelation of the project. In this case, the economic value of the pre-investigation is the expected social value from executing a project that initially looked too costly to implement. For this case, we say that information acquisition prevents false negatives (or type II errors).
Second, we derive the optimal contract when the first-best cannot be implemented due to the presence of hidden information and hidden action. We show that the optimal contract can be implemented by a menu of contracts that offers a fixed-price contract and a range of option contracts. The fixed-price contract obliges the contractor to carry out the project in all cost circumstances for a "fixed-price". The option contract gives the contractor the right to first conduct a pre-investigation and then decide whether to complete the project for an "exercise-price" or, alternatively, quit the project for a "quitting-price". We show that the optimal contract exhibits exercise-prices that are smaller than the fixed-price and quittingprices that are actually penalties. This combination of contracts is the key instrument to solve the incentive problems that arise in the pre-investigation process. Option contracts provide information acquisition incentives for an agent with large cost uncertainties and, in addition, to disclose the acquired information truthfully. At the same time, the combination of low exerciseprices and quitting-penalties deters an agent whose value of information is relatively low to cash in on the information acquisition compensation by simply exerting one of the options without actually acquiring information.
Third, we investigate the distortions in information acquisition under the optimal second best contract. We demonstrate that, in comparison to the first best, the optimal contract induces too much information acquisition to prevent false positives (type I errors) and too little information acquisition to prevent false negatives (type II errors). These distortions in information acquisition are exclusively driven by an information rent effect which occurs, because, in the second best, the principal takes into account the impact of information acquisition on the agent's information rent. Our key insight is that the direction in which the information rent effect distorts information acquisition depends on the error type that the additional information is meant to prevent: If an agent acquires information to prevent false positives, then some projects are canceled which would otherwise have been implemented. This necessarily reduces the ex ante probability with which the project is implemented and, just as in the static model, the principal, therefore, has to give up fewer information rents to achieve compatibility. Hence, the information rent effect provides the principal with excessive incentives to induce information acquisition to prevent false positives. The same logic, yet with the opposite sign, applies when information acquisition is used to prevent false negatives. In this case, information acquisition raises the ex ante probability with which the project is implemented and thus requires higher information rents to more efficient types. Hence, with respect to false negative, the information rent effect provides the principal with too little incentives to induce information acquisition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the relation to the literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 discusses the first-best benchmark. In section 5, we present the principal's problem which we solve in section 6 both with and without contractible information acquisition. In section 7, we discuss the distortions implied by optimal contracting. Section 8 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to the growing literature on optimal dynamic mechanism design. This literature studies optimal contract design in environments in which information is privately revealed to the agents over time and the contract conditions on sequential communication of information by the agents. 3 A recent paper by Pavan et al. (2008) provides a general framework that encompasses earlier contributions on dynamic price discrimination (e.g., Baron and Besanko (1984) , Tirole (1990, 1996) , Battaglini (2005) ), or on sequential screening (e.g. Courty and Li (2000) , Dai et al. (2006) , Esö and Szentes (2007a) ). While this literature takes the arrival of new information as exogenous, our contribution is to endogenize the acquisition of new information by the agent.
Among the mentioned papers, our setup is most similar to the sequential screening model by Courty and Li (2000) who study monopolistic price discrimination when, at the point of purchase, consumers are uncertain about their subsequent true demand yet know that they will obtain additional information before actual consumption. 4 Similar to Courty and Li (2000) , we impose a first order stochastic dominance ranking condition on the family of the conditional cost distributions conditional on the initial signal. 5 In Courty and Li (2000) , this assumption is sufficient for employing a "local" approach that mimics the solution strategy for static screening problems. We demonstrate that this insight remains valid when information acquisition is endogenous. The optimal contract derived by Courty and Li (2000) also displays a menu which 3 A number of papers deals with the design of efficient mechanisms in dynamic environments. See, e.g., Segal (2007a, 2007b) , Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) . 4 Esö and Szentes (2007a) extends Courty and Li (2000) to a multi-agent setting. 5 In contrast, Dai et al. (2006) study an environment with second order stochastic dominance ranking.
contains contracts with quitting options. Thus, our result makes clear that option contracts are a robust feature of optimal sequential screening contracts even if information acquisition is endogenous. In fact, such options not only work to screen consumers, but serve the additional purpose of inducing information acquisition.
Closely related is also the model by Esö and Szentes (2007b) , where the principal can acquire costly, additional information which only the agent can interpret. The authors demonstrate that the principal can fully extract the additional surplus created by the new information and, therefore, the principal always wants to fully disclose the new information to the agent. In contrast to Esö and Szentes (2007b) , in our model it is the agent who acquires additional information. If information acquisition is not contractible, this gives rise to a moral hazard problem which is absent from Esö and Szentes (2007b) . 6 Moreover, the paper does not analyze the distortions that optimal contracting imposes on information acquisition which is a key contribution of our analysis.
Our work is also related to the literature on information acquisition in principal-agent problems. The key difference is that this literature studies the incentives of an agent to acquire private information before he accepts or rejects the contract. Therefore, there is only a single screening stage. Within this literature, the paper closest in spirit is Lewis and Sappington (1997) , who also study information acquisition by an agent in a procurement setting. They assume, however, that the principal always induces the agent to acquire information. Therefore, they do not address one of our central questions, how the incentive problem distorts the amount of information acquisition. Cremer et al. (1998b) ask how the optimal screening contract needs to be adapted when an initially uninformed agent can acquire private information after the contract has been offered. 7 They impose the exogenous contracting restriction that the agent has the right to quit and take his outside option after having acquired information. In our model, 6 Notice also that in principle the agent may be made worse off by the additional information so that he may not want to obtain it even if costless. Indeed, in Krähmer and Strausz (2008) we present a model in which the additional information may actually hurt the agent, since it allows the principal to lower the agent's information rent. Therefore, even if information acquisition is contractible, the agent has to be compensated not only for the direct information acquisition costs but also for the potential reduction in information rent. However, it turns out that this effect is not present in the present model. This implies that Esö and Szentes' (2007b) analysis does not rely on the implicit assumption that the principal can impose the information on the agent. instead, the terms at which the agent can quit ex post are fully contractible. In fact, unlike the contract of Cremer et al. (1998b) , our optimal contract involves bonding and the agent will sometimes make losses ex post (relative to his outside option). Intuitively, bonding improves the principal's ability to prevent the agent from abusing information acquisition to enhance his informational position. In contrast to the two previous papers, Kessler (1998) assumes that the principal offers the contract only after potential information acquisition by the agent. In this case, the principal cannot use the contract to induce any information acquisition by the agent.
Therefore, the principal has even less control over the agent. While all these papers share with us that information is socially valuable, the literature has also studied information acquisition that has no social value but is undertaken for strategic purposes only (see Cremer and Khalil (1992) , Cremer et al. (1998a) ).
Model
A principal seeks to procure one unit of a good from an agent. The principal's valuation for the good is v > 0. There are two periods. In period 1, contracting takes place, and in period 2, the agent produces the good. Before contracting, true costs are not known with certainty but the agent privately observes a noisy signal about true costs. Let the noisy signal be given by the random variableγ and let true costs be given by the random variablec. The agent privately observes the realization γ ofγ, and it is common knowledge thatγ is distributed with distribution function F and density f = F ′ on the support Γ = [0,γ]. We assume that f is strictly positive and differentiable on Γ and that the hazard rate
is non-decreasing in γ.
True costs are equal to the signal plus a random shocks:c =γ +s. The cost shock has support R and is assumed to have zero conditional mean so thatγ is an unbiased estimate of
The additive specification is without loss of generality because the shock can always be defined as the difference between true and expected costs. The assumption that the support of the shock, and thus of true costs, is R is for convenience only and standard in the literature.
with the conditional density g(· | γ). We further assume that the family {G(· | γ)} γ is ranked in terms of first order stochastic dominance. That is, G(· | γ) first order stochastically dominates
A low γ therefore indicates a low actual cost c.
For technical reasons, we assume that h ′ exists and is bounded, and that all partial derivatives of G and g exist and are bounded.
A specific version of our model is the independent case, where the distribution of the shock is independent of γ. Formally, this means that there is a distribution functionĜ such that
This assumption is natural when the cost shock is independent of the agent's average efficiency characteristics such as expertise, experience, or internal organization. A specific example in the context of public procurement is an infrastructure project and the uncertainty pertaining to soil conditions or ground water levels. The independent case guarantees the first order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(· | γ)} γ .
After the contract has been signed and before production takes place, the agent can, at a cost k > 0, perfectly observe s and therefore learn the actual cost c. While the value of k is common knowledge, the principal cannot observe which information the agent receives.
Hence, from the principal's perspective, there is hidden information at the contracting as well as after the information acquisition stage. In the analysis we will consider both contractible and non-contractible information acquisition. Under non-contractibility, there is, in addition to the two informational problems, also a hidden action problem at the information acquisition stage.
Concerning the contracting framework we assume that, at the contracting stage, the principal makes the agent a take-it or leave-it offer. If the agent rejects, he gets a type-independent outside option of zero.
9 LetĜ(s) be the probability thats ≤ s which is independent of γ by assumption. Thus, G(c | γ) =Ĝ(c − γ).
First-best
As a benchmark, we first consider a first-best world, in which all information is publicly observable and information acquisition is fully contractible. In a first best world, the issue is when to execute the public project and to determine for which cost estimates γ the agent should acquire additional information. In particular, a first-best solution specifies for each agent type γ a probability α F B (γ) with which the agent is required to acquire information. Moreover, it specifies a probability q F B (γ, c) with which an agent executes the project who has acquired information and whose true costs turn out to be c. Finally, a first-best contract determines a probabilityq F B (γ) with which an agent who has not acquired information executes the project.
Due to the absence of any strategic concerns, the production probabilities in the first best are either zero or one, depending on whether true or expected costs are above or below the valuation v. Formally,
With these efficient implementation decisions, we can determine the first-best information acquisition levels and understand how, in a first best world, information is used.
Depending on the implementation decision in the absence of additional information, the acquisition of information plays one of two roles. First, if the decision without information acquisition is to implement the project, then the procurer commits a type I error if the costs c turn out to be larger than v. In this case, a loss v − c is realized. Information acquisition prevents this error. The (gross) expected value of information acquisition to prevent type I errors is therefore
Second, if the decision without information acquisition is to cancel the project, then the procurer makes a type II error if the costs c turn out to be smaller than v. Information acquisition prevents this error, and thus the (gross) expected value of information acquisition to prevent type II errors is
According to the first-best implementation decision (3), the procurer optimally implements the project without additional information exactly when γ ≤ v. Hence, the first-best value of information is given by Information acquisition is efficient for all γ with
single-peakedness of J F B implies that there exist exactly two cut-offs γ
2 , which satisfy
Thus information acquisition is efficient if γ ∈ [γ
]. The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1
The first-best implementation probabilities are given by (3). Moreover, it holds:
, the first-best information acquisition probabilities are
(ii) If k ≥ k F B , the first-best information acquisition probability is α F B (γ) = 0 for all γ. 
The principal's problem
We now return to the original problem with asymmetric information and look for the contract that maximizes the principal's payoff. Intuitively, a contract specifies a transfer and the probability with which the agent has to produce the good in period 2. However, if information is private and information acquisition is not contractible, a contract also has to induce the agent to acquire information and communicate his information to the principal. In principle, the number of ways in which the contract can structure the agent's incentives is limitless.
A crucial step to reduce the number of possible contracts is to apply the revelation principle for multistage games (Myerson 1986) , which asserts that the optimal contract can be found in 10 Note:
the class of direct, incentive compatible mechanisms. A direct mechanism has the following structure: First, it requires the agent to submit a reportγ ∈ Γ in period 1. Subsequently, the mechanism gives a, possibly probabilistic, recommendation to the agent whether or not to acquire information. Finally, if the principal recommends the agent to acquire information, the agent is required to submit a second reportĉ ∈ R in period 2.
11
Formally, we denote by α(γ) the probability with which the contract recommends information acquisition if the agent's report isγ. Lett(γ) andq(γ) be the transfer from the principal to the agent and the probability of production if the agent submits a first period reportγ and does not receive a recommendation to acquire information. Finally, let t(γ,ĉ) and q(γ,ĉ) denote the transfer from the principal to the agent and the probability of production if the agent submits a first period reportγ, receives the recommendation to acquire information and submits a second period reportĉ. Thus, a direct contract is a combination (α,t,q, t, q).
A direct contract is incentive compatible under three conditions. First, it must give the agent an incentive to report his first period type truthfully. Second, it must give the agent an incentive to follow the contract's recommendation whether or not to acquire information.
Third, it must give the agent an incentive to report his second period information truthfully whenever he has acquired information and reported his first information honestly.
Formally, let Γ I = {γ ∈ Γ | α(γ) > 0} denote the set of agent types that acquire information with a strictly positive probability. Then the incentive compatibility constraints for period 2 require for all γ ∈ Γ I that
To state the first period incentive constraints, let U(γ) denote the utility of agent type γ if he reports truthfully and adheres to the contract's recommendation:
11 Strictly speaking, the revelation principle requires the agent to report only his new information s. Because, for a given γ, there is a one-to-one relationship between s and c, reporting s is strategically equivalent to reporting c. As it turns out, notation is more convenient if we work with reports about c rather than s. See also Esö and Szentes (2007b) for how to quantify the amount "new information" when signals are correlated.
Incentive compatibility means that the agent cannot attain a higher utility than U(γ) by adopting a dishonest reporting and/or disobedient information acquisition strategy. Notice that whatever the agent does in period 1, if he is required to submit a report in period 2, the second period constraints (9) guarantee that he reports truthfully in period 2. In particular, if a type γ does not acquire information, the second period incentive constraints (9) imply that, whenever he has to report a costĉ, he reports his expected costs γ. 12 Likewise, if type γ reports falsely some other typeγ = γ in period 1 and, after information acquisition, learns his actual costs c, then the constraints (9) imply that he reports c honestly despite any earlier lies. Hence, even though the revelation principle does not require it, our setup yields truthful revelation also off-the-equilibrium path. 13 With this in mind, we now consider all the deviations which incentive compatibility is meant to prevent and classify them in three different groups.
First, an agent type γ must not gain by reporting some typeγ and, subsequently, adhering to the contract's information acquisition recommendation:
Moreover, an agent type γ must not gain by reportingγ and then disobeying when the contract requires him to acquire information:
Finally, an agent type must not gain by disobeying when the contract requires him not to acquire information. However, this cannot be optimal for any agent type, because when the contract prescribes not to acquire information, transfers and implementation probabilities do not condition on the additional cost information c but only on average costs γ so that the value of information for the agent is zero. Thus, the agent would only lose information acquisition costs.
If information acquisition was contractible, there would be only a hidden information problem and the only relevant constraints would be (11), while the constraints (12) would be redundant. In this sense, (11) are pure adverse selection constraints. The constraints (12) only 12 Expected utility of a type γ, who is ignorant of his actual costs c and reports some costsĉ, is t(γ,ĉ) − q(γ,ĉ) cdG(c|γ) = t(γ,ĉ) − q(γ,ĉ)γ. According to (9) his payoff is maximized for a reportĉ = γ. 13 This would be different if the support of final costs c depended on the first period information γ. See
Krähmer and Strausz (2008) for a discussion of the case when the supports of final costs do not overlap.
arise when information acquisition is not contractible. They require truthtelling and action obedience by the agent and, therefore, involve both adverse selection and moral hazard. In this sense, (12) are mixed constraints.
To guarantee the agent's participation in an incentive compatible contract, it needs to be individually rational:
Note that we require individual rationality from an ex ante perspective only. This means that the agent cannot quit after having observed additional information. 14 He might thus make losses ex post. This is the appropriate assumption when long term commitment is possible and "quitting" is publicly verifiable. We call an incentive compatible contract that is individual rational feasible.
The principal's payoff from a feasible contract is the difference between the total surplus and the agent's utility. That is, when the agent is of type γ, the principal's payoff is
and the principal's objective is his expected payoff
The principal's problem, referred to as P, can therefore be stated as follows:
, (11), (12), (13). (16) 6 Solution to the principal's problem
We solve the principal's problem P in several steps. We first consider a relaxed problem, where we ignore the mixed constraints (12). As said earlier, this corresponds to the case in which information acquisition is contractible.
14 This contrasts the assumption in, for example, Cremer and Khalil (1998b) and formalizes the intuitive idea in the introduction that the procurer should retain as much control as possible in order to prevent the agent from abusing pre-project planning to enhance his informational advantage.
Contractible information acquisition
We refer to the relaxed problem with contractible information acquisition as R:
R : max (α,t,q,t,q) W s.t.
(9), (11), (13).
Our procedure to solve problem R is similar to the well-known approach to solve static screening problems without additional ex post information.
15 In static problems, when the agent's cost function satisfies the single-crossing property, then incentive compatibility is equivalent to a monotone allocation rule and the fact that, up to the utility of the least efficient agent, the agent's utility is determined by the allocation alone (revenue equivalence). The latter property implies that the principal's objective does not depend on transfers. In the present context, the first period incentive compatibility conditions (11) cannot be characterized in terms of monotonicity conditions of the allocation rule. The reason is that the agent's utility is given by an expectation over his cost function and so depends on the whole schedule of allocations instead of a single, type specific allocation only. This leaves the single-crossing property without bite.
However, (11) still implies that the agent's utility is determined by the allocation alone. We begin by establishing this property.
Observe that the agent's overall utility consists of his utility when he is informed and his utility when he is uninformed. Let u I (γ, c) ≡ t(γ, c) − cq(γ, c) − k denote the agent's utility when he is informed. Then we can rewrite (10) as
The following lemma demonstrates that, as a consequence of the period 2 incentive compatibility constraints, an informed agent's utility u I is determined by the allocation q(γ, c).
Lemma 1 Let γ ∈ Γ I . Then there are transfers t(γ, c) such that (9) holds if and only if q(γ, c) is non-increasing in c;
The proof of Lemma 1 is standard and therefore omitted. We proceed by deriving a necessary condition that follows from the first period incentive constraint (11) together with (20).
Lemma 2 Under (11) and (20) the derivative U ′ (γ) exists for all γ ∈ Γ and equals
Lemma 2 follows by a standard envelope argument. Since U(γ) = − γ γ U ′ (z)dz + U(γ), the agent's utility is thus determined up to the least efficient agent's utility U(γ). This leaves us to determine U(γ).
In a standard static problem, the utility of the least efficient type is pinned down by the individual rationality constraint, because the single-crossing property on the cost function implies that the agent's utility is monotone in type. Again, since in the present context the agent's utility is given by an expectation over a whole range of allocations, the single-crossing property has no bite and cannot be used to determine U(γ). Instead, we exploit that {G(· | γ)} γ is ranked in terms of first order stochastic dominance. It implies that ∂G(c | γ)/∂γ ≤ 0, and so by Lemma 2, U ′ (γ) ≤ 0. We therefore obtain the following result.
Lemma 3 Under (11) and (20), the individual rationality constraint (13) is equivalent to
Clearly, at the optimal contract it must hold that U(γ) = 0. Setting U(γ) = 0 takes care of the individual rationality constraint and fully determines agent type γ's utility by Lemma 2. Hence, we can insert U(γ) in the objective W . By applying a common integration by parts argument, we obtain the objective as a function of the implementation and the information acquisition probabilities only. 16 This allows us to re-state the problem R as follows:
It is important to note how the constraints in R ′ have changed relative to problem R. Observe that they do not include the individual rationality constraint (13), because it has been used to substitute out the expression U(γ) in the principal's objective. Similarly, by Lemma 1, the 16 The details of the derivation are presented in the Appendix.
period 2 incentive constraints (9) are equivalent to the constraints (19) and (20). Since we have inserted the constraint (20) in the objective, we are left with the monotonicity constraint (19).
Notice however that an analogous argument to eliminate the period 1 incentive constraint (11) does not work because, unlike Lemma 1, Lemma 2 states only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for (11). Thus, even though we have inserted into the objective the utility expression (21) derived from (11), we have not eliminated the constraint (11). It is precisely at this point where the analogy to the standard static problem breaks down.
In the static problem, incentive compatibility is equivalent to monotonicity plus revenue equivalence so that one is only left with a monotonicity constraint after revenue equivalence has been used to substitute out the agent's utility in the principal's objective. The problem is then solved by considering the unconstrained problem which can be solved by point-wise maximization. Under a regularity condition on the hazard rate similar to (1), the solution to the unconstrained problem automatically satisfies monotonicity.
Similarly to the static problem, we will now ignore the constraints (11) and (19) and derive the solution to the unconstrained problem. This solution will automatically satisfy the monotonicity condition (19) due to the monotone hazard rate condition (1). In contrast to the standard problem however, we still have to show that transfers exist such that the solution to the unconstrained problem satisfies (11).
Before we state the solution to the unconstrained problem, it is helpful to interpret the objective (22) in terms of virtual costs that is familiar from the static framework. We can think of the principal as maximizing total surplus where, instead of true costs, he faces higher virtual costs that arise because an information rent has to be conceded to the agent. If information acquisition does not take place, the virtual costs are γ + h(γ). They are the same as the virtual costs in the static screening problem in which agent types cannot acquire additional information. As usual, the hazard rate h(γ) measures the extent of asymmetric information between the agent and the principal about the expected costs γ. If information acquisition does take place, the virtual costs are c −
∂G(c|γ)/∂γ g(c|γ)
h(γ). They are the same as the virtual costs in a sequential screening problem of the sort considered in Courty and Li (2000) in which each agent type exogenously observes the cost shock. The term
is an informativeness measure 17 which captures how the agent's private knowledge about the true cost distribution G changes across types. Thus, the modified hazard rate −
h(γ) measures the extent of asymmetric information between the agent and the principal about true costs c. From now on, we denote the informativeness measure as
As is usual in the sequential screening literature, we impose the regularity assumption that ψ is non-increasing in both arguments and that for all γ ∈ Γ:
In the independent case where the signal and the cost shock are independent, (2) implies
This means that the possibility that the agent receives additional information in period 2 does not change the degree of asymmetric information in period 1.
We now turn to the solution to the unconstrained version of problem R ′ . The solution can be obtained by point-wise maximization for each γ in two steps. In the first step, the optimal implementation probabilities are determined for fixed α(γ). This step is well-known from the static screening literature and amounts to setting the allocation q(·) to zero if the associated term in the squared brackets in (22) is strictly negative and setting it to one otherwise. This procedure yields:
Lemma 4 For each γ there is a unique c 0 (γ) ≤ v and there is a unique γ 0 ≤ v given by
such that the optimal implementation probabilities in the solution to the unconstrained version of problem R ′ are given by
17 This term was introduced by Baron and Besanko (1984) . Lemma 4 reveals the typical distortions that are implied by the rent-efficiency trade-off that the principal faces. The principal distorts the implementation probabilities downwards relative to the first-best. When no information is acquired, the project is implemented only when expected costs γ are smaller than γ 0 ≤ v, while it is efficient to implement the project when γ ≤ v. When information is acquired, the project is implemented only when true costs c are smaller than c 0 (γ) ≤ v, while it is efficient to implement the project when c ≤ v. The downward distortion lowers the information rent the principal needs to concede to the agent, because it reduces the extent to which a relatively efficient type can cash in on his cost advantage by mimicking a relatively inefficient type.
The second step is to determine the optimal information acquisition probabilities. Similarly to the first best, whether the optimal contract induces an agent type γ to acquire information depends on the implementation decision in the absence of information acquisition. Just as in the first-best, the purpose of information acquisition is to prevent type I or type II implementation errors. Indeed, suppose that the principal implements the project in the absence of further information. In this case her payoff is v − γ − h(γ). If information is available, the project is implemented if costs are smaller than c 0 (γ) in which case the principal obtains the payoff v − c + ψ(γ, c)h(γ). Thus, the principal's value of information (net of information acquisition costs) is
Since
Hence,
Expression (30) reveals that, due to information rents, the principal's value of information is distorted relative to the first-best. From the principal's perspective, a type I error occurs if Note that the definition (27) implies that c 0 is non-increasing in γ because ψh is nonincreasing in γ and c. Moreover, h is non-decreasing so that the first order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(· | γ)} γ implies that J * I (γ) is increasing.
Similarly, suppose that, in the absence of information acquisition, the principal cancels the project. In this case, information acquisition prevents a type II error whenever the value of the project v exceeds the virtual costs c − ψ(γ, c)h(γ). The principal's value of information (net of information acquisition costs) is therefore
Because h is non-decreasing and c 0 is non-increasing, the first order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(· | γ)} γ implies that J * I is increasing and J * II decreasing, J * (γ) is single-peaked with a maximum at γ 0 of
Information acquisition by an agent type γ is optimal for the principal exactly when
single-peakedness of J * implies that there are exactly two cut-offs γ Lemma 5 The optimal information acquisition probabilities in the solution to the unconstrained version of problem R ′ are given as follows:
.
(34)
The next proposition establishes the existence of transfers which, jointly with the solution to the unconstrained problem, satisfy the constraints (11) and (19). They therefore represent a solution to the constrained problem R ′ .
Proposition 2 There are transfers (t * , t * ) such that the contract C * = (α * ,t * ,q * , t * , q * ) solves problem R ′ and is, therefore, optimal.
Since the modified hazard rate −ψh is non-decreasing in γ, it is evident from inspection that the implementation probabilities q * satisfy the monotonicity constraint (19). The less obvious part of Proposition 2 is the construction of transfers so that the first period adverse selection constraints (11) are satisfied. Recall that for given implementation and information acquisition probabilities, the agent's utility must necessarily be of the form stated in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, because otherwise incentive compatibility could not be met. This, in turn, determines transfers through the definition of U and u I . It then remains to be shown that the transfers thus defined imply (11). But this is a consequence of the first order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(· | γ)} γ which therefore plays a role analogous to the single-crossing property in the static context.
In the remainder of this section, we describe how the optimal direct mechanism C * can be implemented indirectly by a menu of contracts that gives the agent a choice between a fixed price contract and variety of option-price contracts. This contract will only prescribe the probability of information acquisition α and the transfers t conditional on the agent's decision whether to execute the project. We focus on the non-trivial case k ≤ k * in which some agent types are required to acquire information under C * .
Under C * , whenever the agent announces a typeγ > γ * 2 , he is required to refrain from information acquisition and project implementation. Because in this case the transfer is zero, announcing a typeγ > γ * 2 is equivalent to rejecting the contract.
If the agent announces a typeγ < γ * 1 , then the contract C * requires him not to acquire information and implement the project with probability 1. Since α * andq * are constant for allγ < γ * 1 , incentive compatibility implies that the transfert * (γ) also has to be constant for allγ < γ * 1 . We refer to this fixed transfer ast * . Therefore, announcing a typeγ < γ * 1 is equivalent to a "fixed-price" contract which obliges the agent to complete the project at all cost circumstances for the pricet * .
Finally, if the agent announces a typeγ ∈ [γ * 1 , γ * 2 ], the contract requires him to acquire information and to implement the project if and only if he announces in period 2 a cost valuê c ≤ c 0 (γ). Because q * (γ, ·) equals one and is, therefore, constant forĉ ≤ c 0 (γ), incentive compatibility implies that the transfers t(γ,ĉ) forĉ ≤ c 0 (γ) must also be constant. We denote this transfer by t * 1 (γ). Similarly, because q * (γ, ·) equals zero forĉ > c 0 (γ), incentive compatibility implies that the transfers t(γ,ĉ) forĉ > c 0 (γ) must also be constant. We denote this transfer by t * 0 (γ). Hence, it follows that we can describe the transfer schedule t * (γ, ·) by the two transfers t * 1 (γ) and t * 0 (γ). This observation allows the interpretation of an "option" contract: After announcing a typeγ ∈ [γ * 1 , γ * 2 ] and acquiring information, the agent has the option in period 2 to carry out the project for the "exercise-price" t * 1 (γ) or to quit for the "quitting-price" t * 0 (γ).
It follows that the outcome induced by the direct mechanism C * can also be induced by the
The menu consists, first, of the fixed-price contract (α * = 0,t * ) which requires the agent not to acquire information and execute the project at transfert * and, second, of a range of option contracts (α * = 1, t * 1 (γ), t * 0 (γ)) γ which require the agent to acquire information and give him to option to complete the project for a transfer t * 1 (γ) or quit the project for a transfer t * 0 (γ). Note that the transfers in contract C ′ do not depend on the agent's announcement of cost c, but instead condition transfers only on whether he executes the project. As a result, the contract C ′ is an indirect rather than a direct mechanism. We summarize the alternative characterization of the optimal contract in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 If k ≤ k * , then the outcome under the optimal contract C * also obtains with
} which offers a choice between a fixed-price contract and a range of option contracts.
The proposition shows that, when the cost of information acquisition is small enough, k < k * , the optimal contract requires the agent to acquire information. Hence, the threat that the agent abuses pre-project planning to enhance his informational position does not cause information acquisition to break down. This confirms theoretically the empirical observation of Gibson and Hamilton (1994) that pre-project planning has a positive effect. Moreover, the proposition points to the degree of control that suffices to achieve this: the contract can explicitly condition on whether the agent acquires information and executes the project. In the next subsection, we investigate the more realistic case that the agent's effort to acquire information is unobservable. This introduces a hidden action problem and makes information acquisition non-contractible and implies less contractual control by the principal.
Non-contractible information acquisition
When information acquisition is not contractible, the optimal contract must also satisfy the mixed constraints (12). We first derive a condition under which these constraints do not impose additional restrictions on the principal's problem. We then show that under (26) this condition is automatically satisfied. That is, when the signalγ is independent of the cost shock s, the optimal contract with contractible information acquisition can be implemented even if information acquisition is not contractible.
Of course, if information acquisition costs are sufficiently large such that the optimal contract C * does not prescribe any information acquisition, then it does not matter whether information acquisition is contractible or not, and C * is optimal in either case. So consider the more interesting case, k ≤ k * , where k is small enough for C * to prescribe some agent types to acquire information. In this case, C * can be implemented through the contract C ′ from Proposition 3.
We show that there are two straightforward necessary conditions for C ′ to satisfy the constraints (12). The first necessary condition is that t *
The condition is necessary, because if t * 0 (γ) were strictly positive for some γ, then a type γ ′ ≥ γ * 2 would have a strict incentive to announce type γ and then, without acquiring information, simply cash in the quitting-price t * 0 (γ) > 0. This behavior would make the cost type γ ′ strictly better off than reporting his type truthfully, in which case he would receive a transfer of zero. The second necessary condition is that the exercise-price must not be higher than the price under the fixed-price contract, that is,t
The condition is necessary, because ift * were smaller than t * 1 (γ) for some γ, then a relatively efficient type γ ′ < γ * 1 would have a strict incentive to report type γ rather than his true type γ ′ and then, without acquiring information, choose the option to implement the project. This behavior would allow him to complete the project for the transfer t * 1 (γ) instead of the lower transfert * .
We now argue that these two conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient for the contract C ′ to satisfy the constraints (12). To show sufficiency, it remains to be checked that
, who is supposed to acquire information actually does so. There are two deviations to consider. First, suppose that this agent type picks an option contract but deviates by quitting the project without acquiring information. The deviation yields a non-positive transfer t 0 (γ) and rejecting the contract would be a weakly better deviation. But since C ′ is individual rational, rejecting the contract cannot be profitable. Second, suppose that an agent type γ ∈ [γ * 1 , γ * 2 ] picks an option contract but deviates by completing the project without acquiring information. If this deviation is profitable, then, due tot * ≥ t * 1 (γ), an even more profitable deviation is to pick the fixed-price contract. But because contract C ′ satisfies the adverse selection constraints (11), this second deviation is also not profitable. Thus, we have established:
Lemma 6 The contract C * satisfies the mixed constraints (12) if and only if for all γ ∈ [γ * 1 , γ * 2 ]:
In other words, the optimal contract with contractible information acquisition is also incentivecompatible without contractible information acquisition if and only if option contracts display quitting-penalties as well as exercise-prices that are lower than the price of the fixed-price contract. The combination of "low" exercise-prices and quitting-penalties achieves two objectives.
First, it motivates agent types with large cost uncertainties to acquire additional information.
Second, it deters other agent types to simply cash in the compensation for information acquisition costs without any information acquisition.
The crucial question now is whether the contract C * satisfies the condition (35). In general, the answer depends on properties of the distribution G(c | γ). We now show that in the independent case, C * meets (35).
Proposition 4 In the independent case, the contract C * satisfies (35), and thus solves problem P.
We mention, without proof, that the proposition holds under weaker assumptions than the independence assumption. Yet, there are alternative distributions for which the optimal contract with contractible information acquisition violates (35). In these cases, a rigorous analysis is complicated, because of the possibility of bunching.
Distortions

Information acquisition
In this section, we investigate the distortions in information acquisition. Recall that from an efficiency perspective, it is worthwhile to acquire information when the expected benefits from reducing implementation errors exceed the costs of information acquisition. The perspective of the principal is different. Instead of the overall surplus, she is only interested in the share of the surplus that she can extract. Due to asymmetric information, the principal must leave a part of the surplus -the information rents -to the agent, and consequently she is also interested in how information acquisition affects these rents. In this section we identify an information rent effect, which distorts the principal's incentives for inducing information acquisition.
Recall that the role of information acquisition depends on the default decision whether or not to execute the project in the absence of additional information. In particular, information acquisition is used to prevent type I errors (false positives), when the default decision is to execute the project. In contrast, it is used to prevent type II errors (false negatives), when the default option is to cancel the project. We now show that the distortions in information acquisition are directly linked to the type of errors that information acquisition prevents.
First, suppose that information acquisition is used to prevent type I errors. In this case, the social value of information acquisition is J F B I (γ) while the value to the principal is J *
The inequality shows that the principal overvalues information acquisition relative to the first best. That is, for preventing type I errors there is a positive information rent effect which increases the principal's value above the first best value of information.
The intuition behind why the information rent effect is positive is as follows. When additional information prevents type I errors, some projects are turned down that would otherwise have been implemented. This means that, from an ex ante perspective, information acquisition reduces the implementation probability q (from one to something strictly smaller than one).
A reduction in q for some cost type implies that, from a period 1 perspective, it becomes less worthwhile for a more efficient cost type to mimic this cost type. Hence, the principal has to pay lower information rents to the more efficient cost types when inducing information acquisition. This explains why the information rent effect of preventing type I errors is positive. As a result, the optimal contract displays excess information acquisition to prevent type I errors:
Next, suppose information acquisition is used to prevent type II errors. In this case, the social value of information acquisition is J F B II (γ) and the value to the principal is J * II (γ). Due to ψ(γ, c)h(γ) ≤ 0 and c 0 (γ) = v − h(γ), it now follows
The inequality shows that the principal undervalues information acquisition relative to the first best. That is, for preventing type II errors there is a negative information rent effect which decreases the principal's value below the first best value of information.
Although the sign of the information rent effect is now negative, the intuition behind the result follows the same logic as the one we presented for type I errors. When additional information prevents type II errors, some projects are implemented that would otherwise have been canceled. This means that, from an ex ante perspective, information acquisition increases the implementation probability q (from zero to something strictly larger than zero). An increase in q for some cost type implies that, from a period 1 perspective, it becomes more worthwhile for a more efficient type to mimic this cost type. Hence, the principal has to pay higher information rents to the more efficient cost types when inducing information acquisition. This explains why the information rent effect of preventing type II errors is negative. As a result, the optimal contract displays too little information acquisition to prevent type II errors:
In sum, (39) and (43) 
Maximum value of information
We next address distortions in the maximum value of information. Proposition 3 shows that, from a social welfare perspective, information acquisition is most valuable for an agent type γ = v, where the uncertainty about whether the project yields a positive or negative value is largest. The maximum social value of information acquisition is
Lemma 5 demonstrates that, from the principal's point of view, information acquisition is most valuable for an agent of the type γ 0 . Consequently, the maximum value of information acquisition from the principal's perspective is
A direct comparison of (44) and (45) reveals that the values differ due to three effects. First, in the first best the project is executed when c ≤ v, whereas the project is executed in the second best only for c ≤ c 0 (γ 0 ). This implies that, in the second best, the project is executed for a smaller range of cost realizations. Second, the value of information acquisition itself differs by the information rent h(γ 0 ). Just as the first effect, this second effect causes the value of information to be lower in the second best. Third, in the first best the value of information is maximal for the agent type v, whereas in the second best it is maximal for the more efficient agent type γ 0 . Because G(·|v) stochastically dominates G(·|γ 0 ), this last effect increases the maximum value of information in the second best and thus countervails the first two effects.
Therefore, the overall effect on the maximum value of information is ambiguous and depends on the relative strengths of the three different effects.
Although we cannot say in general whether the maximum value of information acquisition is larger in the first or the second best, we obtain unambiguous results in the independent case.
Independence implies the following relationship between the first best and second best value of information:
Hence, the principal's value of information from a type γ matches the social value of information of the agent type γ ′ = γ + h(γ). The relationship implies that the maximum value k * in the second best coincides with the maximum value in the first best k F B . Moreover, the principal's and the social value of information are the same for the most efficient type γ = 0. Because the hazard rate h(γ) is increasing, the relationship (46) implies that the curve J F B is a stretched 20 The derivation is in the Appendix. 
Conclusions
We study how a principal optimally deals with the incentive problems in project management when, due to large cost uncertainties, procurement projects require pre-project planning.
These incentive problems typically involve both hidden information and hidden action. A general conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that, despite the diverse incentive problems, the principal generally benefits from inducing the agent to conduct pre-project investigations.
In line with the applied literature on project management, the principal should however not relinquish too much control to the agent. In particular, she should not allow the agent to first acquire information and then decide about accepting the contract. This is harmful to the principal, because it enables the agent to abuse the pre-project planning phase to enhance his informational advantage. Instead, we demonstrate that the principal can provide optimal incentives through a menu of option contracts from which the agent can select before acquiring additional information. These option contracts give the agent a costly quitting option and, thereby, achieve the dual goal of providing incentives for information acquisition as well as truthful revelation.
We show that the hidden information problem leads to systematic distortions in information acquisition. In a first best world without incentive problems, the acquired information from preproject investigations is either used to mitigate cost overruns (type I errors) or to prevent false negatives (type II errors). In a second best world, where the agent has private cost information (ex ante hidden information), the principal has to pay the agent information rents. The way in which information acquisition affects these rents depends on the exact use of information acquisition: When information acquisition prevents type I errors, it reduces information rents.
When information acquisition prevents type II errors, it increases information rents. This leads to the distortion that, in comparison to the first best, the principal induces the agent to acquire too much information to prevent type I errors and too little information to prevent type II errors.
The hidden action problem may lead to additional distortions beyond those created by the hidden information problem alone. We show, however, that this is not the case, when the agent's initial cost estimate is independent of his forecasting error. In this sense, the hidden information problem is more severe than the hidden action problem. The formal analysis of the case in which the initial cost estimate is correlated with the forecasting error, becomes considerably more involved and requires a more stylized model to remain tractable.
where we have used that U(γ)F (γ)|γ 0 = U(γ) = 0. Inserting this in the objective (15) 
Proof of Proposition 2
We have already argued in the main text that q * satisfies (19). Next, we define transfers (t * , t * ) and then compute the utilities induced by (α * ,t * ,q * , t * , q * ) and verify (11).
The construction of transfers is guided by the necessary conditions that incentive compatibility and individual rationality impose on the agent's utility, given (α * , q * ).
(i) For γ > γ * 2 , α * = q * = 0, and so individual rationality implies thatt * (γ) = 0.
(ii) For γ ∈ [γ * 1 , γ * 2 ], the project is implemented if and only if c < c 0 (γ). Thus, period 2 incentive compatibility implies that t * (γ, c) is equal to some fixed, c-independent transfer t * 1 (γ) if c < c 0 (γ) and to some fixed, c-independent transfer t * 0 (γ) if c ≥ c 0 (γ). Moreover, the critical type c 0 (γ) has to be indifferent between executing and not executing the project, that is:
Hence, given α * = 1, the utility of an agent of type γ is 
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Now, individual rationality implies that U(γ * 2 ) = 0, and this pins down t * 0 (γ * 2 ):
Moreover, (21) implies that U ′ (γ) = c 0 (γ) −∞ ∂G/∂γ dc. In light of (56), the derivative of t * 0 , therefore has to satisfy t * ′ 0 (γ) = −c 
(iii) For γ < γ * 1 , since α * = q * = 1, incentive compatibility implies thatt * (γ) has to be equal to some fixed, γ-independentt * . Moreover, incentive compatibility also implies that the agent's utility is continuous at γ * 1 , so that we havet * − lim γ↑γ * 
We can now verify that (α * ,t * ,q * , t * , q * ) satisfies (11). LetŨ(γ; γ) be defined as in (47). To simplify notation, we omit the asterices in the following derivations. We have to show that ∆ ≡ U(γ) −Ũ (γ; γ) ≥ 0 ∀γ,γ.
Indeed, the fact that U(γ) =Ũ(γ;γ) implies ∆ = U(γ) − U(γ) +Ũ (γ;γ) −Ũ (γ; γ) = 
A sufficient condition for this to be non-negative is that (a) α(γ)q(γ, c) is non-increasing in γ for all c, and (b) (1 − α(γ))q(γ) is non-increasing in γ.
To see this, letγ < γ. Then (b) implies that the integrand in the integral in the second line is non-positive for all z ∈ [γ, γ] and thus, the second line is non-negative. As for the first line, recall that first order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(· | γ)} γ implies ∂G/∂γ ≤ 0.
This together with (a) implies that the integral
[α(z)q(z, c) − α(γ)q(γ, c)]∂G(c | z)/∂γ dc is non-negative for all z ∈ [γ, γ]. Thus, also the first line is non-negative. Forγ > γ, the argument is analogous.
To complete the proof, observe that (α * ,q * , q * ) satisfies (a) and (b). Hence, we have established that ∆ ≥ 0, and this completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Note that because ψ = −1 in the independent case, the definition (27) of c 0 implies that c 0 (γ) = v−h(γ). We now show that t * 0 (γ * 2 ) = 0. Indeed, with c 0 (γ) = v−h(γ), we obtain by (57) that
